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THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY AND PEACE
INITIATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fourth year

Letter dated 23 January 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a letter dated 22 January 1990 from Father Miguel D'Escoto, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua, addressed to Mr. James Baker III, Secretary of State of the United States of America.

I should be grateful if you would have the letter distributed as an official document of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Daysi MONCADA BERMUDEZ
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex

LETTER DATED 22 JANUARY 1990 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF NICARAGUA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Yesterday, in the course of normal duties as part of the electoral process in the town of Quilalí, in the region of Nueva Segovia, military-intelligence officers succeeded in deciphering communications sent between contra troops in which they mentioned a plan to assassinate Daniel Ortega Saavedra, constitutional President of Nicaragua and candidate of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in the elections to be held in February, by means of an ambush set up between Quilalí and San Juan del Río Coco.

These communications were sent by means of sophisticated equipment supplied by the Government of the United States as part of the misnamed "humanitarian aid".

The Government of Nicaragua protests most vigorously to the United States Administration and holds the Government of the United States responsible for this criminal activity on the part of 1,500 mercenaries who, operating out of their bases in Honduras, recently infiltrated into our national territory and have been carrying out a series of ambushes and assassinations of government, religious and civil leaders and intimidating the population through death threats in order to induce them not to vote for the FSLN and not to attend its rallies.

In denouncing these crimes, we must also point out that all this is part of a policy of the United States Government to disrupt one of the cleanest, most transparent - and, without any doubt, most closely observed - electoral campaigns ever held in an independent country, and to obstruct a process of genuine democratization and independence in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua has a clear duty not only to denounce and condemn this continuing bellicose and interventionist policy but also to inform the international community of the situation.

Consequently, we intend to have the text of this note of vigorous protest and condemnation circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations and of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr
GENERAL

S/21102
25 January 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 22 July 1989-25 January 1990)

Introduction

1. In its resolution 639 (1989) of 31 July 1989, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months, until 31 January 1990. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978), and called upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

Organization of the Force

2. As of January 1990, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

Military personnel

Fiji	HQ UNIFIL	14	
	Infantry battalion	670	
	Force Mobile Reserve	35	
	Military police	8	727
Finland	HQ UNIFIL	12	
	Infantry battalion	500	
	Force Mobile Reserve	16	
	Military police	9	537
France	HQ UNIFIL	16	
	Composite battalion (maintenance company, defence company, armoured escort company)	472	
	Military police	10	498
Ghana	HQ UNIFIL	28	
	Infantry battalion	751	
	Engineer company	75	
	Force Mobile Reserve	33	
	Military police	7	894
Ireland	HQ UNIFIL	33	
	Infantry battalion	655	
	HQ Camp Command	34	
	Force Mobile Reserve	17	
	Military police	12	751
Italy	HQ UNIFIL	4	
	Helicopter unit	44	
	Military police	4	52
Nepal	HQ UNIFIL	12	
	Infantry battalion	811	
	Force Mobile Reserve	28	
	Military police	5	856
Norway	HQ UNIFIL	29	
	Infantry battalion	588	
	Maintenance company	243	
	Force Mobile Reserve	33	
	Military police	16	909

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Sweden	HQ UNIFIL	21	
	Logistic battalion	618	
	Force Mobile Reserve	5	
	Military police	8	652
	Total UNIFIL	5 876	a/

a/ The total UNIFIL strength includes 17 officers from the Force (5 Fijians, 6 Ghanaians and 6 Nepalese) who have been temporarily assigned to serve with the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP).

The deployment of UNIFIL as of January 1990 is shown on the map attached to the present report.

3. The command of UNIFIL continues to be exercised by Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren of Sweden.

4. In the period under review, 65 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assisted UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks. Sixty-four of these unarmed officers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and are under the operational control of the Commander of UNIFIL. They man the five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line. They also operate four mobile teams in parts of the area of operation, including those under Israeli control, the so-called "security zone". One UNTSO military observer is attached to UNIFIL headquarters as a member of the Operations Branch.

5. Logistic support for UNIFIL was provided by the Swedish logistic battalion, elements of the French composite battalion, the Norwegian maintenance company and the Italian helicopter unit, as well as by UNIFIL's civilian staff, especially in the areas of communications and vehicle maintenance.

6. Arrangements to improve the ability of UNIFIL to deal with explosive ordnance have now been completed. Expert teams of the Irish contingent search for, and dispose of, explosive ordnance in the Irish battalion sector, as well as training personnel from the other UNIFIL battalions in these tasks.

7. The Force Mobile Reserve, a composite mechanized company, consisting of elements from seven contingents (Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Norway and Sweden), organized as an integrated unit, has been frequently called upon to reinforce UNIFIL battalions. The Force Mobile Reserve has again demonstrated its value on many occasions during the current mandate.

8. The strength of the Lebanese army unit serving with UNIFIL stands currently at 128, all ranks. The bulk of the unit is stationed at Tyre, while small elements are at Arzun, Al Yatun and Qana.

9. I regret to report that, during the period under review, seven members of the Force, one Ghanaian, one Irish, two Nepalese, two Norwegians and one Swede, lost their lives from firing, accidents and natural causes. Eight others suffered injuries as a result of accidents. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 171 civilian and military members of the force have died, 65 as a result of firing or mine or bomb explosions, 75 in accidents and 31 from other causes. Some 233 have been wounded by firing or mine or bomb explosions.

10. Following the announcement on 31 July 1989 by a group in Lebanon that it had killed Lieutenant-Colonel William Richard Higgins, who had been kidnapped on 17 February 1988 while serving as Chief of the UNTSO military observers assigned to UNIFIL (see S/19617), I have made every effort to ascertain the facts concerning Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins' fate and to endeavour to recover his body if it is true that he has been killed. These efforts have not yet produced any conclusive evidence as to Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins' fate despite extensive conversations with various parties who may be in a position to know the facts. My efforts to establish the facts will continue.

11. In the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 31 July 1989 (S/20758), the members of the Security Council, inter alia, reaffirmed their profound concern over the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel and called upon all parties to do their utmost to ensure the effective reinforcement of the security of the members of the Force. UNIFIL itself has maintained its efforts to improve the security of its personnel and positions. The relocation of the headquarters of the Norwegian battalion to a defensible compound near Ebel es Saqi is progressing and is expected to be completed during the current year. The security and defence of the Naqoura camp and of the headquarters of the Irish battalion have also been improved. More positions throughout the UNIFIL area of deployment have been reinforced with protective measures. Ten modern armoured personnel carriers (APCs) have been made available by Finland for use by the Irish battalion and provide, inter alia, increased protection and security to that battalion's personnel and positions. This arrangement has been financed from a voluntary contribution received from the Government of Japan after consultation with the donor Government.

12. The Security Council has been informed, in several previous reports, of UNIFIL's difficulties in obtaining the land and buildings it requires in its area of operation. In my last report (S/20742, para. 11), I informed the Security Council that the difficulties remained acute and that they resulted from arrears in the payment of rent by the Government of Lebanon to the landlords concerned and from the sharp depreciation of the real value of such rent payments as were made. That situation was exacerbated during the first three months of the current mandate by the shortage of accommodation which resulted from the influx into southern Lebanon of people fleeing the hostilities in Beirut. In recent consultations the Lebanese Government has undertaken to make a renewed effort to pay the arrears of rent due.

Situation in the UNIFIL area

13. UNIFIL remained unable to extend its area of operation up to the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 425 (1978). Israel continued to control in southern Lebanon an area manned by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the de facto forces (DFF) or so-called "South Lebanon Army" (SLA). This area is known to UNIFIL as the "Israel controlled area" (ICA). The boundaries of ICA have not been clearly defined but are determined de facto by the forward positions of IDF and DFF. It includes territory adjacent to the international border, part of the Nepalese, Irish and Finnish battalion sectors and the entire Norwegian battalion sector, as well as sizeable areas to the north of the UNIFIL area of operation. Its approximate extent within the UNIFIL area of operation is indicated on the attached map. (It should be noted that the map does not show the areas under Israeli control north of the UNIFIL area.) Within the UNIFIL area of operation, the positions maintained by IDF and DFF increased to 70, as compared to 64 during the last reporting period (see S/20742, para. 12). The IDF and DFF positions are shown on the attached map. IDF personnel were observed in DFF positions on numerous occasions, especially at night.

14. In the period under review, UNIFIL recorded a total of 47 operations by resistance groups against IDF and DFF targets (10 in August, 8 in September, 10 in October, 10 in November, 3 in December and 6 in January). These operations usually took the form of attacks with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, rockets and mortars; mines and roadside bombs were also often used against IDF/DFF vehicles and foot patrols.

15. Activities from IDF/DFF positions or patrols, whether in retaliation for attacks by armed elements or unprovoked, often involved the use of heavy artillery, tank and mortar fire and Israeli helicopter gunships. Fire from IDF/DFF positions or patrols resulted in many firings close to, and on occasions direct hits on, UNIFIL positions. In the current reporting period, there were 151 unprovoked firings close, all of which were protested by UNIFIL to IDF. Indiscriminate fire from DFF positions has on several occasions resulted in fatal injuries to civilians in the UNIFIL area of operation.

16. UNIFIL has been subjected to other harassments, e.g. threats to UNIFIL personnel and damage to UNIFIL property by IDF and DFF personnel, all of which were protested to the Israeli authorities.

17. Following a car bomb attack against an IDF convoy within ICA on 9 August 1989, IDF/DFF closed a number of access roads between that area and the rest of Lebanon. These measures have affected the freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel as well as that of the military observers of OGL. Protests were made to the Israeli authorities and after negotiations, UNIFIL troops were again able to move along some of the roads in question. These road closures have also caused hardships to the local population. Particularly affected were the inhabitants of Rshaf, a village in the Nepalese battalion sector, who have been unable to communicate by car with the region north of their village, since IDF closed the access road to it. Following negotiations with IDF, UNIFIL has been able to provide, as part of its humanitarian activities, water, medicines and health services to the village.

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18. As in the previous reporting period, firings close to UNIFIL positions resulted also from action by resistance groups; in most cases, such firings stopped after warnings by UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL has invariably opposed attempts by armed elements to establish their own check-points within its area of operation. All such check-points were dismantled following negotiations between UNIFIL and the armed elements concerned. Other incidents between UNIFIL and armed elements resulted mostly from the refusal of armed elements to have their vehicles searched by UNIFIL personnel or from the denial to armed individuals of passage through UNIFIL check-points. At times these incidents resulted in harassment and threats against UNIFIL personnel, attempts at forced entry or even firing close to and at UNIFIL check-points.

19. The following paragraphs describe some of the more serious incidents which occurred during the current mandate period.

20. On 15 November 1989, two uniformed DFF personnel in a civilian vehicle approached a check-point in the Norwegian battalion sector, near the village of Ebel es Saqi, where the headquarters of the Norwegian battalion is located. After the DFF personnel refused to comply with UNIFIL instructions concerning passage through the check-point, the UNIFIL sentry fired warning shots. The DFF personnel got out of their car, exchanged warning shots with UNIFIL soldiers, readied a light anti-tank weapon for action and threw a grenade which exploded near the UNIFIL position by the check-point. During the exchange of warning shots, one of the DFF personnel was wounded, apparently by a ricochet. He was taken to the Marjayoun Hospital, where he was later pronounced dead. Thanks to efforts by all sides concerned, the resulting tension was defused and further serious confrontations were avoided.

21. Another fatal incident took place in the evening of 29 November, when a UNIFIL patrol, consisting of an armoured personnel carrier of the Norwegian battalion, with its lights on and flying a fully illuminated United Nations flag, accompanied by two soldiers on foot was fired at with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons. One of the two soldiers was hit and subsequently died from his injuries. UNIFIL has not so far been able to establish beyond doubt the identity of those responsible for the attack.

22. A further serious incident occurred at dawn on 21 December 1989, when the DFF compound in Al Qantarah in the Finnish battalion sector directed tank, mortar and heavy machine-gun fire indiscriminately in all directions in response to the firing of an anti-tank round by unidentified armed elements. One of the tank rounds fired by DFF impacted on a position of the Irish battalion, badly damaging the sleeping accommodation. The incident could have resulted in heavy UNIFIL casualties, had the soldiers not vacated their billet and taken shelter in time. The incident was strongly protested to IDF.

23. A very tense situation developed in the Norwegian battalion sector in the evening of 25 December 1989, when an IDF battery entered that sector and deployed near a UNIFIL position. When UNIFIL protested this breach of an informal agreement under which IDF do not undertake operational missions in the Norwegian battalion sector, it was informed that the deployment was part of a training exercise.

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Shortly thereafter, however, the IDF battery fired more than 50 rounds towards the north. Despite UNIFIL's protests, the battery remained deployed until the morning of 26 December. The deployment of the IDF battery in the Norwegian battalion sector and the use of that sector as a fire base has subsequently been protested to senior Israeli military and civilian authorities.

24. In my report to the Security Council of 21 July 1989 (see S/20742, para. 25), I informed the Council of the construction by IDF of an access road for military purposes in an area within Lebanon to the south of the eastern extremity of the Norwegian battalion sector. Construction of the road began in late July 1989 and has interrupted the access of Lebanese civilians to their properties in the area. Following a letter addressed to me by the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon on 27 November 1989 (see A/44/805-S/20993), the matter was again raised by UNIFIL officials with Israeli military and civilian authorities. The Israeli authorities promised to look into the matter, specifically the access of Lebanese civilians to their properties, and inform UNIFIL accordingly. UNIFIL has recently reminded them that a reply is awaited.

25. The current mandate period has seen a further strengthening of Israeli control over ICA, with significant consequences for the daily life of the civilian population. This control is exercised through the military activities of IDF and DFF and through "civilian administration offices" that have been opened in a number of towns and villages in ICA. These offices have responsibilities in the fields of security, intelligence, the collection of taxes and other levies and various other civilian administrative functions. An important role is also played by the security branch of DFF known as the General Security Service (GSS). Many gendarmes previously appointed by the Lebanese Government have been prevented by GSS from carrying out their duties and some gendarmerie stations have been closed.

26. On several occasions UNIFIL personnel have witnessed the abduction of young men for service in DFF. This enforced recruitment also involves threats and punitive action (e.g. eviction from their villages) against the families of young men who are reluctant to join DFF. Israel has made further efforts to enhance the operational effectiveness of DFF, e.g. by the provision of better equipment and improved training programmes. As noted in paragraph 13 above, there has also been an increase in the number of IDF/DFF positions in ICA.

27. In recent months Israel has also imposed stricter control over movement between ICA and the rest of Lebanon. This has involved the closure of roads and for some villages has meant a disruption of their traditional economic and social links with their neighbours. Any inhabitant of ICA wishing to travel to other parts of Lebanon has to obtain from the "civilian administration office" a travel permit (in effect, an internal passport), which is valid for six months only but can be used for multiple journeys. Passage out of or into ICA has to take place at one of a small number of designated crossing points where strict control is enforced.

28. The "civilian administration offices" have recently issued new vehicle licences and registration plates that are manufactured in Israel and are different from those used in the rest of Lebanon. Vehicle owners have been required to

obtain the new licences and plates in return for a fee payable in United States currency.

29. Israel also plays an increasing role in the economic and social life of the population of ICA. More than 2,000 Lebanese workers are permitted to cross daily to employment in Israel, this being regarded as a privilege to be extended mostly to the families of men serving in DFF/GSS. Israeli products are imported into ICA and several towns and villages there have been linked to the Israeli water or telephone networks. Israel has financed the improvement of roads and has made doctors available to work in hospitals in ICA, some of which are administered by IDF.

30. Although some of these activities may be of benefit to the local population, UNIFIL has observed, in those parts of its area of operation which overlap ICA, a growing disquiet at this deepening of the occupation. In some cases, notably in the village of Chebaa in the Norwegian battalion sector, the establishment of a "civilian administration office" has been strongly resisted by the inhabitants. UNIFIL is often asked to provide support and protection in such cases and does everything it can to ensure that the human rights of the population of ICA are respected.

31. UNIFIL troops detonated mines and roadside bombs, as well as unexploded remnants of war, in the area of operation. A total of 10 controlled explosions were carried out.

32. UNIFIL pursued its efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the maximum extent possible within available resources. As was the case during previous mandates, such assistance was given by individual battalions, mainly in the medical and hygiene areas and in support of welfare institutions, out of funds provided by the troop-contributing Governments. In addition, UNIFIL medical centres in the area of operation provided, during the current mandate, care to an average of 3,700 civilian patients per month; at the UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura, some 900 Lebanese civilian patients were treated, approximately 200 of them as in-patients. The humanitarian assistance provided by UNIFIL continued to be of great importance, especially at a time when Lebanese facilities in the UNIFIL area of operation were stretched to the limit, owing to the sudden influx of people fleeing from the hostilities in Beirut.

33. Close co-operation in the humanitarian field between UNIFIL and the Lebanese authorities, the United Nations agencies and programmes operating in Lebanon, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations has continued during the current mandate.

Financial aspects

34. By its resolution 44/188 of 21 December 1989, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed $12,001,000 gross ($11,806,000 net) per month for the 12-month period beginning 1 February 1990, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond

the period of six months authorized under its resolution 639 (1989). If the Council decides to extend UNIFIL beyond its current mandate period, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Force during the extension period would be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 44/188, assuming an average maximum force strength of 5,850 troops and continuance of the Force's existing responsibilities.

35. As at the beginning of January 1990, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account for the mandate periods ending 31 January 1990 amounted to $318 million, which is equivalent to the budget of the Force for over two years at the current rate of expenditure.

Observations

36. I regret that I again have to inform the Security Council that UNIFIL remains unable to implement the mandate given to it by the Security Council in resolution 425 (1978), namely, to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.

37. Israel maintains the policy outlined in previous reports (see S/20416, para. 32). During the current mandate period, the positions occupied by IDF and those of DFF have again increased. As described in paragraphs 25 to 30 above, Israel has further strengthened its hold on ICA, the so-called "security zone", and has introduced there some elements of a civilian administration in which a leading role is given to DFF. This is a matter of growing concern in Lebanon. At the same time attempts by armed elements to infiltrate Israel and air and ground attacks by the Israeli forces on targets in Lebanon well to the north of the UNIFIL area have continued. International peace and security have not therefore been restored.

38. The current mandate period has, however, seen positive developments on the wider Lebanese scene. The Security Council, in its statement of 27 December 1989 (S/21056), welcomed the election of Mr. Elias Hrawi as President of the Lebanese Republic and the appointment of the Lebanese Government led by Prime Minister Salim al Hoss. In the same statement, the members of the Council expressed their support for President Hrawi's efforts in implementation of the Taif Agreement to deploy Lebanese Government forces to restore central government authority over all Lebanese territory.

39. In recent consultations with me and members of my staff, the Lebanese authorities have stressed their conviction that the restoration of constitutional authority in Lebanon creates new possibilities for making progress towards the long overdue implementation of Security Council 425 (1978). They have spoken of their determination to take early steps to re-establish the central Government's authority in southern Lebanon, including the deployment there of units of the Lebanese army. UNIFIL stands ready to play its part in assisting the restoration of the Government's authority in southern Lebanon, including deployment of units of the Lebanese army there.

40. In these circumstances I recommend that the Security Council should accept the request, conveyed in the letter dated 11 January 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations (S/21074), and extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months until 31 July 1990.

41. In making this recommendation, I must also draw the Security Council's attention to the fact that there has been no easing of the difficulties which UNIFIL faces and which have been described in earlier reports. During the current mandate period, the Force has again suffered loss of life and other casualties as well as continuing harassment, as a result of the activities of various armed groups in the area. It is inexcusable that United Nations peace-keepers should be subjected to constant threats and danger. I appeal once more to all parties concerned to co-operate with UNIFIL with a view to ensuring the security of its members and of course helping them to carry out the tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council. I am also deeply dismayed that, in spite of persistent efforts - and in particular those of Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, who again visited the region this past week - it has not so far been possible to ascertain with certainty the fate of Lieutenant-Colonel William Richard Higgins. I repeat my most vigorous condemnation of the ordeal to which this courageous officer and his family have been subjected.

42. The safety of UNIFIL personnel is a matter of continuing concern to me and, during the current mandate period, significant efforts have been undertaken to improve further the security of UNIFIL personnel and facilities. This vitally important question will continue to be monitored closely and security arrangements on the ground will be modified and updated where necessary.

43. UNIFIL's financial situation also remains grave. The total of unpaid assessments has again increased and now amounts to some $318 million. This represents money owed by the United Nations to the Member States that have voluntarily contributed troops to serve in UNIFIL, often in conditions of danger and discomfort. It is difficult to understand why such a problem should afflict a United Nations peace-keeping operation that has such an important mission and whose mandate has repeatedly been renewed by unanimous vote of the Security Council. I hope that recent developments in Lebanon will cause the Governments concerned to re-examine their positions, both as regards the payment of their assessed contributions and as regards effective support at the political level to my efforts to secure implementation of resolution 425 (1978).

44. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, the Force Commander, and to all the men and women under his command and control, both military and civilian, for the courage and determination with which they have again faced a difficult mandate period. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.


جنـــوب لبنـــان
黎巴嫩南部 • SOUTHERN LEBANON
LIBAN MÉRIDIONAL
ЮЖНЫЙ ЛИВАН • LÍBANO MERIDIONAL
As Sarafand
LEBANON
Ansar
Az Zrārīyah
SEA
MEDITERRANEAN
SŪR (TYRE)
TRANSIT BASE
BN HQ
Burj ash Shamālī
GHANBATT
Ar Rashīdīyah
Ra's al 'Ayn
FIJIBATT
NEPBATT
FINBATT
UNIFIL HQ
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

ورغ قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان إعتبارا من كانون الثاني/يناير ١٩٩٠

一九九〇年一月联黎部队部署情况

UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JANUARY 1990

DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS DE JANVIER 1990

ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ЯНВАРЬ 1990 ГОДА

DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN ENERO DE 1990

مركز مراقبة	نقطة تفتيش X	قاعدة ●	موقع مؤقت ⊗
观察所	哨卡站	基地	临时阵地
Observation post	Check point	Base	Temporary position
Poste d'observation	Point de contrôle	Base	Position temporaire
Наблюдательный пункт	Контрольный пункт	База	Временная позиция
Puesto de observación	Puesto de control	Base	Posición provisional

حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان

联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边

UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North

Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord

Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ, Запад и Север

Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza: Oeste y Norte

الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان

联黎部队各营之间界限

UNIFIL Inter Battalion boundaries

Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force

Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ

Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza

● وحدة لبنانية

黎巴嫩单位

Lebanese Unit

Unité libanaise

Ливанские подразделения

Unidad libanesa

موقع لقوات الدفاع الاسرائيلية و/او ● "جيش جنوب لبنان"

以色列国防军和（或）"南黎巴嫩军"阵地

Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position

Position des Forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"

Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"

Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"

المحاذاة التقريبية لما يقع تحت السيطرة الاسرائيلية من منطقة عمل قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان

联黎部队行动地区内在以色列控制下地区概况

Approximate area under Israel control in UNIFIL area of operation

Périmètre approximatif de la zone sous contrôle israélien dans la zone d'opérations de la FINUL

Примерный район в зоне действия ВСООНЛ, находящийся под контролем Израиля

Area aproximada bajo control israelí dentro de la zona de operaciones de la Fuerza

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21103
24 January 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The attached letter, dated 23 January 1990, was addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations. In accordance with the request contained in the letter, the text is being circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Annex

Letter dated 23 January 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward to you the statement dated 22 January 1990 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed statement, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) HO Jong
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Observer of the
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea to the United Nations

Enclosure

Statement dated 22 January 1990 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

It is a unanimous desire of the entire Korean people and the world's peace-loving people to accomplish the cause of Korean reunification in the 1990s.

The proposal to pull down the wall of division between the north and the south and ensure free travel and complete opening made by the respected leader President Kim Il Sung in his New Year Address is an epochal national salvation measure to end the nearly half-a-century-long history of Korean division and confrontation which began in the 1940s and start a new history of reunification.

This new national salvation proposal has evoked widespread repercussions at home and among the foreign public world-wide.

This indicates that the international community earnestly desires the relaxation of the situation on the Korean peninsula and its peaceful reunification.

At this very moment, the United States and the south Korean authorities have made public a plan to stage the massive "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises this year, far from showing a positive response to our new save-the-nation proposal.

This has caused the surprise of the world public and disappointed the world's people who had pinned their hopes on the promotion of the north-south dialogues and the reunification of Korea.

Moreover, the decision of the United States and the south Korean authorities to stage the large-scale nuclear attack exercises directed against the opposite side at a time when fruits are in sight at the ongoing north-south dialogues is nothing but a deliberate act of military confrontation to put a spoke in the wheel of north-south dialogues and block the relaxation of the situation of the Korean peninsula.

This is a challenge to the desire of the entire Korean people for reunification and the hope of the world's peace-loving people for disarmament and détente.

No sooner had the United States declared to the world an end to the cold war and the advent of an era of peace than it launched an armed invasion of Panama, a sovereign State. No one can vouch that it would not start a war against the north on the Korean peninsula any moment in the same way behind the smoke-screen of the "Team Spirit" joint manoeuvres.

If a country staged a large-scale military exercise in the sea off the United States, how would the United States authorities react to this?

While stating that it is pursuing a "policy of détente" in Europe, the United States is increasing tensions in Asia, not lowering the level of military confrontation there.

Motivated by this policy, it seeks to keep a hold on the Korean peninsula as a source of increasing tensions and a hotbed of war.

The United States and the south Korean authorities are trying to conceal the true colour of these war exercises against peace, dialogue and reunification by pretending to have decided to cut the scale of the projected "Team Spirit" joint military exercises. But their scale can hardly be considered to be reduced even in view of the data announced by them.

And they are trying to fool the world public with their clumsy talk about an "invitation to observe" the "Team Spirit" manoeuvres. But they can never conceal the aggressive, provocative nature of this war game.

The scheme of the south Korean authorities again to stage the nuclear war exercises, threatening fellow countrymen with foreign forces, clearly proves that their deed entirely contradicts their statement that they welcome free travel and complete opening.

It is impossible either to build mutual confidence or to hold an honest dialogue under the circumstances of such nuclear war exercises as "Team Spirit". Free travel and a full-scale open-door presuppose mutual confidence and détente and they are incompatible with nuclear war exercises.

The United States and the south Korean authorities must not contend that there is no concrete wall cutting across the Korean peninsula at its waist, but must pull it down and cancel at once the plan for the "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises which obstruct free travel and complete opening between the north and the south and the promotion of north-south dialogues.

If the United States and the south Korean authorities dare to perpetrate the war exercise on the Korean peninsula, they will invite a deserved denunciation from the entire Korean people and the world's peace-loving people and be held wholly responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom.

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S/21104
24 January 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 JANUARY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, and with reference to document S/21093, I have the honour to invite your attention to the following:

The Islamic Republic of Iran released 53 sick and wounded Iraqi POWs of which 50 were repatriated to Iraq through the International Committee of the Red Cross on 17 January 1990. The other 3 Prisoners refused to go back to Iraq in the presence of the delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in continuation of its established practice, took this unilateral action out of a genuine humanitarian concern - illustrating its solid intention for achieving a lasting peace in the region, despite the recent deafening official propaganda coming out of Baghdad.

The unilateral release of 53 Iraqi sick and wounded prisoners by the Islamic Republic of Iran was a practical step following its official proposal to the International Committee of the Red Cross for the complete repatriation of all the sick and wounded POWs. This step presented the Iraqi officials with an opportunity to practice what they preach. It gave them an opportunity to take a similar action which would have led to an early repatriation of all the sick and wounded prisoners of war, pending the day Iraqi officials decide to implement resolution 598 whose urgent objectives apart from withdrawal of troops to the Internationally recognized boundaries is the immediate release and repatriation of all POWs.

Iraqi officials not only failed to avail themselves of this opportunity, but also began to complain in document S/21093 that the number of POWs recently released by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a small number! Notwithstanding such Iraqi complaint about the "smallness of figure 50", Iraq turns around and releases only 20 Iranian sick and wounded POWs who returned to Iran aboard the same plane which carried 50 Iraqi POWs to Iraq! This is quite ironic! Iraqi officials have unfortunately exploited the issue of POWs and have changed this humanitarian issue to a distorted political game of numbers. This is a clear illustration of Iraq's lip service to the issue of repatriation of POWs. The Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to reiterate the proposal it had previously submitted to the International Committee of the Red Cross for a complete repatriation of all the sick and wounded

POWs from both sides, and herewith draws the attention of the International Community to such irresponsible Iraqi behaviour which sabotages a possible plan for such repatriation.

Iraqi officials have underlined their commitment to the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949 in document S/21093 and continue that "all prisoners should be released and repatriated without delay on cessation of active hostilities. Active hostilities ceased on 20 August 1988". Under such circumstances, undoubtedly the Iraqi officials must know that according to the same convention they have been legally obligated to unilaterally repatriate all Iranian POWs without delay after 20 August 1988 when they believe active hostilities ceased. They must know that the Third Geneva Convention rejects the concept of reciprocity in this context. The only rational explanation for the evident disgraceful contradiction between Iraq's words and deeds is this régime's desperate attempt to misuse the United Nations machinery and to manipulate public opinion.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, however, has taken several practical initiatives, the latest of which was the unilateral release of 53 sick and wounded Iraqi POWs. It has also both publicly and privately maintained that Iraq's occupation of Iranian territory is the prima facie evidence of Iraq's aggression against Iran and therefore active hostilities has not ceased on 20 August 1988. The fact that Iraqi forces have taken more than 700 Iranian military personnel as well as some civilians as captives after the establishment of cease-fire is a clear proof of the veracity of this position.

The Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to reaffirm its position that resolution 598 is a totality which has taken the plight of POWs into consideration and it only needs the political will, not the lip service, of Iraq to consent to its implementation through the plans of the Secretary-General. Needless to point out that if Iraq had made such a political decision in the first place when direct talks began, global repatriation of all Prisoners of War would have been completed before the end of 1988. The time for public deception and propaganda has long been passed, and the time for practical steps to be adopted in the interest of peace and tranquillity within the context of resolution 598 is long overdue.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/21105
25 January 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 24 JANUARY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Having noted the letter dated 15 January 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/21078), which confirms the approach adopted by the Iranian régime of making use of propaganda tricks in order to mislead the United Nations and the international community so as to reduce the pressure on it to engage in a comprehensive exchange of prisoners, we should like to state the following:

1. The claims made by the Iranian régime to the effect that it has been making efforts to mitigate the suffering of the prisoners since the inception of the war are false. They have no relation to reality, given that the régime in question persists in its failure to respond to the numerous initiatives announced by Iraq concerning the need for a comprehensive exchange of prisoners in accordance with the third Geneva Convention of 1949. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the other international and humanitarian organizations are fully aware of the positions of both Iraq and Iran on this humanitarian issue.

It is clear from the figures given in the list contained in the Iranian letter showing the number of Iraqi prisoners already returned to Iraq that the latter represent only a very small part of the total number of Iraqi prisoners held by Iran, both registered and unregistered, who continue to languish in captivity despite the cessation of active hostilities on 20 August 1988. Reference to those figures, at this precise time, proves that it is the devious approach of the Iranian régime to exploit this matter as a propaganda exercise aimed at relieving the international pressure to which it is subjected in view of its disgraceful attitude towards the prisoner-of-war issue, an attitude which is in violation of international humanitarian law as represented by the third Geneva Convention of 1949.

2. It is stated in the Iranian letter that Iran has allowed 27,800 families to visit 9,900 Iraqi prisoners of war. This claim is untrue, and it is a clear demonstration of the character of the Iranian régime, which is renowned for mendacity, deception and duplicity. Iraq was the precursor in calling for the families of the prisoners, on both sides, to be allowed to visit them. The recent

initiative of President Saddam Hussein, which he announced on 6 January 1990 on the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of the Iraqi army, contained a paragraph concerning the arrangement of such visits. However, these calls, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations and ICRC are aware, were not accepted by the Iranian side.

3. From the beginning of the war with Iran and up to the present moment, the Iraqi Government has spared no effort in endeavouring to halt the suffering of the prisoners of war. It established contacts with diverse international and humanitarian organizations and with foreign countries, and it responded positively to the various initiatives and calls to do everything possible to help bring about a full exchange of prisoners captured in the Iraq-Iran war. So that the United Nations may be fully aware of the Iranian prisoners that have been released by the Iraqi Government, of whom there are 977, we include here under a table showing the number of batches released together with the date of release.

No.	Batch	Number of prisoners	Date of release
1	First batch	35	16 January 1981
2	Second batch	40	25 August 1981
3	Third batch	37	15 December 1981
4	Fourth batch	32	30 April 1983
5	Fifth batch	190	29 January 1984
6	Sixth batch	100	20 October 1984
7	Seventh batch	30	27 May 1985
8	Eighth batch	30	2 July 1985
9	Ninth batch	29	7 August 1985
10	Tenth batch	28	5 September 1985
11	Eleventh batch	55	9 October 1985
12	Miscellaneous batch	8	Handed over to their relatives under the supervision of ICRC
13	Twelfth batch	17	21 November 1985
14	Thirteenth batch	25	30 October 1988
15	Fourteenth batch	56	24, 26 and 27 November 1988
16	Fifteenth batch	255	23 and 24 January 1989
17	Sixteenth batch	20	18 January 1990
	Total	977	

4. The Iraqi Government takes this opportunity to reaffirm the initiative announced by President Saddam Hussein on 6 January 1990 on the occasion of the commemoration of the sixty-ninth anniversary of the establishment of the Iraqi army, in which he called for the release and repatriation of all sick and wounded prisoners without exception, for the release and repatriation of those who had spent a long period of time in captivity, namely those captured in 1980, 1981 and 1982, and for the registration of all prisoners still unregistered. All of this was within the context of achieving a full exchange of prisoners of war in order to bring an end to their suffering and the concern of their families.

The Government of my country hopes that you, ICRC and the international community will support this initiative and call upon Iran to accept it, in accordance with article 118 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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S/21106
25 January 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that the Iranian armed forces have committed the following violations of the cease-fire provisions:

1. At 0800 hours on 11 January 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a roller and four dump trucks was observed strengthening the tubular sections located at the end of the abandoned bridge on the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 679153, 1,000 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

2. At 1630 hours on 11 January 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and four dump trucks was observed building a road at co-ordinates 566200, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

3. At 1330 hours on 13 January 1990, the Iranians fired a burst from a single-barrel machine-gun in the direction of our units in the Givrud area at co-ordinates 546823, 3,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

4. At 0940 hours on 13 January 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of three dump trucks, an excavator, a tractor-trailer and a bulldozer was observed building an earth road at co-ordinates 563207, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

5. At 0920 hours on 14 January 1990, a group of about 20 Iranians was observed repairing a communications trench on hill 466 at co-ordinates 965115, 2,500 metres from our II Army Corps units.

6. At 1010 hours on 14 January 1990, a group of about eight Iranians was observed erecting a 60- to 70-metre-long concertina-wire barrier at co-ordinates 158813, 1,000 metres from our II Army Corps units.

7. At 0900 hours on 14 January 1990, two Iranians were observed fishing in the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 543282, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

8. Between 1610 and 1720 hours on 15 January 1990, 18 Iranians dug four unroofed and unmanned positions at co-ordinates 965121, 2,500 metres from our II Army Corps units.

9. At 0800 hours on 15 January 1990, an Iranian engineering unit equipped with an excavator was observed modifying the earth embankment at co-ordinates 648162, 1,000 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

10. At 1610 hours on 16 January 1990, two backhoes were observed operating behind the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 282689, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

11. At 1700 hours on 17 January 1990, the Iranians proceeded to put up a 180-pound tent behind the barbed wire at co-ordinates 142795, 400 metres from our II Army Corps units.

12. At 1610 hours on 17 January 1990, two dump trucks were observed building an embankment 500 metres long and 0.5 metres high at co-ordinates 548257, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

13. At 1100 hours on 17 January 1990, an excavator was observed strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 267703, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

14. At 1400 hours on 17 January 1990, four Iranians were observed building a rest shelter of blocks at co-ordinates 266996 on the east bank of the Doveirij river opposite Ayn Karzan, 1,500 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

15. At 0950 hours on 18 January 1990, four Iranians were observed fishing at co-ordinates 543280, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

16. At 1000 hours on 18 January 1990, the Iranians began to build a 5-metre-long foundation for a metal tower behind the first embankment at co-ordinates 963765, 1,200 metres from our III Army Corps units, and, at 1215 hours, proceeded to cover it with earth.

17. At 1245 hours on 19 January 1990, the Iranians replaced one single-barrel machine-gun with another at their position 96 at co-ordinates 571798, 2,000 metres from our II Army Corps units.

18. At 1140 hours on 19 January 1990, a group of about 10 Iranians was observed building a rest shelter of stones and mud to the lower left of hill 466, at co-ordinates 964119, 2,000 metres from our II Army Corps units.

19. On 19 January 1990, the Iranians erected an 8-metre-high metal tower at co-ordinates 933873, 2,500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

20. At 0840 hours on 19 January 1990, nine Iranians were observed erecting four 180-pound tents, three of them at co-ordinates 267997 and one at co-ordinates 267007, behind the east bank of the Doveirij river opposite Ayn Karzan, 2,000 and 2,500 metres respectively from our IV Army Corps units.

21. At 1500 hours on 19 January 1990, 10 Iranians were observed building a rest shelter of blocks behind the east bank of the Doveirij river and to the east of Ayn Karzan at co-ordinates 267998, 2,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

22. At 0700 hours on 19 January 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and two dump trucks was observed building a road at co-ordinates 561209, 1,200 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

23. At 0915 hours on 19 January 1990, two Iranians were observed fishing at co-ordinates 546221, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

24. At 1230 hours on 19 January 1990, a 5-metre-high antenna was noticed on top of a brick-built house at co-ordinates 507384, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

25. On 20 January 1990, the Iranians built two observation posts on their embankment at co-ordinates 949792, 1,000 metres from our III Army Corps units.

26. At 1700 hours on 20 January 1990, a backhoe was observed digging behind the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 083634, 2,000 metres from our II Army Corps units.

27. At 0730 hours on 20 January 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer, a roller and four dump trucks was observed building an earth road at co-ordinates 652162, 1,350 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

28. At 0800 hours on 20 January 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and three dump trucks was observed building a 3,000-metre-long earth road at co-ordinates 547257, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

29. Between 12 and 15 January 1990, the Iranians amassed quantities of stones in the Kannar area at co-ordinates 245065, between 3,500 and 5,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units. On investigation, it appeared that they were facing a canal with stones for the purpose of channelling the water. The work is still continuing. The canal in question runs along co-ordinates 249039, 249045, 248052, 247056 and 245065.

Flooding operation

The Iranian side is continuing its flooding operation in the direction of our III Army Corps opposite the defensive positions of our military units. The water levels have been as follows:

30. 11 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 65-165 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-180 centimetres.

31. 12 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-85 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 60-165 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-175 centimetres.

32. 13 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-85 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 65-165 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-175 centimetres.

33. 14 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-85 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 65-165 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-170 centimetres.

34. 15 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 60-165 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-170 centimetres.

35. 16 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 65-170 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-170 centimetres.

36. 17 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 65-170 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-170 centimetres.

37. 18 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-85 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 65-170 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-170 centimetres.

38. 19 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 65-170 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-170 centimetres.

39. 20 January 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 65-170 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-170 centimetres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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30 January 1990
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LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Corrigendum

Page 2, item 19, line 2

For co-ordinates 933873 read co-ordinates 939874

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25 January 1990

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 47
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 24 January 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 24 January 1990 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Özer Koray, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 47, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mustafa AKSIN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 24 January 1990 from Mr. Özer Koray
to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed by my government to bring to your attention the following in relation to the rearmament efforts of the Greek Cypriot administration of South Cyprus:

1) The Greek Cypriot daily Alithia of November 10, 1989 reported that "millions of Cyprus pounds" will be spent on purchase of new modern weapons for the Greek Cypriot National Guard. According to the same source, this new move was debated, at some length, during a Defense Committee meeting of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives where the Greek Cypriot "Minister of Defense", as well as officers belonging to the "National Guard", briefed the Committee members on future arms purchases.

2) Another Greek Cypriot daily, Eleftheria Tis Gnomis of November 23, 1989 reported that, in accordance with a 3-year rearmament program prepared by the "Ministry of Defense", the total amount of spending on new arms was estimated at 300 million Cyprus pounds. The Greek Cypriot "Minister of Defense", Mr. Andreas Aloneftis, was quoted in the same daily as saying that the program had been submitted to the House Defense Committee, and that the question now was to secure the necessary funds. Reportedly, Mr. Aloneftis said that the funds which had accumulated in the "Defense Fund" fell short of covering the new additional spending envisaged by the program and that several ways and means for increasing these funds were now under consideration.

Mr. Aloneftis added that, among the new measures considered for this purpose by his Ministry, were an exclusive tax increase on the wages and salaries of those employed in the public service, and the transfer, into the "Defense Fund", of part of the proceeds from the VAT to be levied shortly.

3) At the end of November, it was reported in Greek Cypriot newspapers that, as a new measure for strengthening the so-called "Defense Fund", tax bills, providing for price increases in cigarettes and fuel, had been introduced in the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives. The new bills propose an increase of 7 cents per liter of fuel and an increase of 3 cents per packet of cigarettes followed by 2% annual increases for the next four years. The same sources reported that a separate bill had also been tabled for doubling taxes earmarked for armament purchases on incomes and expenditures from 2% to 4%.

4) It was reported in the Greek dailies Agon and Simerini of December 2, 1989 that, at a meeting organized by Greek Cypriot lawyers in Nicosia, Mr. Aloneftis stated that the Greek Cypriot military forces had reached a level of strength that could effectively confront the "forces of Atilla" and that, military power, *which constituted the corner-stone of his administration's foreign policy*, would be further strengthened. In reply to questions, Mr. Aloneftis added that, currently, a 10-year rearmament program, including purchase of tanks and missiles, was being implemented, and confirmed that his administration attached great importance to militarization.
Mr. Aloneftis further added:

> "The reason for reinforcing our armed forces with tanks and missiles is that these are the most powerful (effective) weapons against enemy tanks. And now we are considering buying fighter jets against those of our enemy. This will happen at a later stage. But we shall set up the necessary infrastructure to this end. We shall train personnel for our airforce. Presently, personnel is being sent to the Airforce Academy in Greece for training."

In any future war with Turkey, Mr. Aloneftis said, his armed forces were in a position to defeat "Atilla's forces" with the active support of Greece. The presence of Greek officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard,

he added, was a clear indication of the existing close ties and cooperation between his Ministry and that of Greece. Mr.Aloneftis, in response to other questions, said that Greek Cypriot reserves would be called in for readiness exercises which would last upto one week. Greek Cypriot women would also be drafted into the army on a long-term basis. Mr. Aloneftis was also reported as saying that Greek Cypriot forces would, in case of "emergency", return to their former sentries unmanned in accordance with the Deconfrontation Agreement.

5) In an interview published in the Greek Cypriot daily Proina Nea of January 7, 1990, the Greek Cypriot "Minister of Defense" stated that, in case of war, Greece would fight alongside the Greek Cypriots and that the Greek Airforce and Navy units would provide cover for the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Mr. Aloneftis renewed his side's determination to continue with full vigor its present rearmament efforts. He said:

> "As a result of the recent weapons purchases, the National Guard is now in a position to engage in war..We must be prepared for war at all times. To this end, we must secure the mass mobilization of our people."

Referring to the militia forces in Southern Cyprus, Mr. Aloneftis noted that new inland units would be formed throughout the South, in addition to those already established along the borders. These forces would be deployed in all areas, including shorelines, airports, fuel and ammunition depots and strategic road-crossings.

6) Simerini of January 8, 1990 reported that a second aircraft purchased for the Greek Cypriot National Guard had been delivered to the Greek Cypriot authorities in South Cyprus. The "Pilatus PC-9" aircraft, used in combat training, was named "Ammohostos" (Famagusta). It will be recalled that the first aircraft acquired by the Greek Cypriots was named "Kyrania" (Kyrenia).

The above military measures taken by the Greek Cypriot administration are the latest examples of the ongoing rearmament program heedlesly pursued by the Vassiliou regime in South Cyprus against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The statements in the same vein of the Greek Cypriot "Defense Minister" also testify clearly to the military ambitions of his administration. As you are well aware, the military build-up in South Cyprus has assumed new proportions since the coming to power of Mr. Vassiliou in 1988.

Our authorities have drawn your attention to this trend at every opportunity and have stressed its implications on the process of negotiations between the two sides under Your Excellency's good offices mission. So far this perilous trend in South Cyprus has not changed, and today, its adverse effects on the relations between the two peoples are felt very strongly. The Greek Cypriot arming frenzy will have to stop before the two peoples can begin to look forward to a federal association between their respective states.

At a time when the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is faced with a hostile neighbor whose daily "foreign policy" considerations, namely the aggressive policies towards the Turkish Cypriots, are shaped by and closely linked to the increasing level of militarization in South Cyprus, we would like to draw, once again, the attention of all concerned to the gravity of the situation prevailing in the island. We feel that this is highly pertinent especially at a time when Your Excellency is engaged in new efforts for the resumption of the stalled talks between the two sides.

Our concern in connection with the level of militarization in South Cyprus is based on facts and figures. The situation on the ground needs no overt or covert means to monitor. Our calls for an early reversal of this situation have gone unheeded. Therefore, the need has arisen to place on record, for the benefit of everybody, our many representations in the face of the ongoing war-like preparations in South Cyprus. To this end, I am enclosing copies of my letters (attached as appendices 1-9) addressed to Your Excellency since April 1989 which highlight the rearmament efforts of the Greek Cypriot administration, the extent of military build-up in South Cyprus, as well as the aggressive measures taken in this regard and the provocative statements made by the Greek Cypriot leaders over this period.

Özer KORAY
Representative of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

APPENDIX I

Letter dated 25 April 1989 from Mr. Özer Koray
to the Secretary-General

The Turkish Cypriot side is deeply concerned by recent Greek Cypriot news reports on the activities of the Greek Cypriot underground terrorist organizations in South Cyprus and especially their efforts to arm themselves. These efforts culminated in the recent pilfering of weapons from the Greek Cypriot National Guard armories. This alarming development was widely reported in the Greek Cypriot press of April 14-15, 1989. I would like to bring to your attention the following pertinent information, as reported in the Greek Cypriot press, in relation to the recent turn of events in South Cyprus.

The Greek Cypriot daily, Apoyevmatini, reported that the Greek Cypriot Minister of the Interior, Mr. Christodoulos Benjamin, confirmed the existence of organized groups engaged in illegal operations throughout South Cyprus. The so-called Minister of the Interior, as related in the news item, further noted that, although members of such groups were known and kept under surveillance by the Greek Cypriot authorities, no legal action was taken against them. In any event, Mr. Benjamin conceded that illegal possession of arms, in large numbers and outside the control of the Greek Cypriot administration, had become the rule in South Cyprus.

Another Greek Cypriot daily, Eleftherotipia, reported that a Greek Cypriot arrested in this connection revealed the location of a number of guns stolen from the army camps. According to the same report, a Greek Cypriot spokesman confirmed that other weapons were now in the hands of illegal groups and that the matter was under investigation.

The Greek Cypriot weekly, Epikeri, wrote that a National Guard soldier, also arrested for complicity in the theft of arms from the camps, disclosed that large sums of money had been offered to him for this purpose by members of a group calling itself "The Organization". Epikeri also reported that a Greek Cypriot civilian, notorious for his pre-1974 terrorist activities, was also active in promoting the arming efforts of this group. According to another daily, Mesimerini, the so-called "Organization" is already in possession of sufficient quantities of weapons stolen from the National Guard armories for launching its operations.

Given these reports, Your Excellency will no doubt share our concern in the face of this upswing in such familiar terrorist activities among the Greek Cypriots. The emerging underground organizations in the South are very reminiscent of the EOKA-type militant groups which terrorized the Turkish Cypriot population during the 1963-1974 period. The current upsurge of terrorist activities in South Cyprus comes at a time when the Greek Cypriot administration is engaged in a massive build-up of its offensive forces. The Turkish Cypriot side has repeatedly underlined the potential dangers of such ill-intentioned and self-defeating courses of action which serve only to erode confidence between the two peoples. The emergence of new armed elements in South Cyprus, whose hostile aims are only too well-known to the Turkish Cypriot side, will further exacerbate the tense situation. Needless to say, the continuation of Your Excellency's good offices mission and the success of the current talks between the two leaders in the island depend largely on the creation of an atmosphere conducive to a settlement. In the circumstances, this will require a great deal of effort on the part of the Greek Cypriot side.

Özer Koray
Representative

APPENDIX II

Letter dated 25 April 1989 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

I would like to bring to your attention the recent decision of the Greek Cypriot Council of Ministers, as reported in the Greek Cypriot press of April 15, 1989, authorizing the Minister of Defense to conscript Greek Cypriots over the age of 50 for military service in the so-called "Militia Forces", established recently with the declared aim of attacking the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus "at an opportune time".

The decision of the so-called Council of Ministers, as related by the Greek Cypriot daily Filelefthеros, envisages the drafting of all Greek Cypriot citizens for compulsory service, for a period of up to 26 months, ostensibly for organizing the population behind the frontiers and setting up of militia groups in urban centers. Virtually all Greek Cypriots, including reserves and those lacking military training, will be required, by way of individual summons, to take part in monthly military exercises.

The formation of "Militia Forces" as part of the illegal National Guard in South Cyprus, and the conscription of all able-bodied Greek Cypriots for military service, can only be interpreted as an act of preparation for war and constitutes a

blatant provocation against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The recent remarks made by the war-mongering Commander of the National Guard and the so-called Defense Minister, coupled with the accelerated pace of the arms build-up in South Cyprus, are open manifestations of the hostile intentions of the Greek Cypriot administration.

The Turkish Cypriot side is closely monitoring these dangerous developments in South Cyprus. The present aggressive policies of the Greek Cypriot side are totally incompatible with the agreed aim of the ongoing talks between the two sides in Cyprus, namely the creation of a federal Republic based on mutual trust and good-neighborliness between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot peoples. We hope that our concern will be equally shared by all those who support an early settlement in the island. The underlying difficulty, however, will persist so long as the Greek Cypriot administration is treated by the world community as the "legal" government of Cyprus and its intransigent stance encouraged by certain circles. The Turkish Cypriot side has demonstrated its genuine desire for a bi-zonal federal settlement based on the equal political status and participation of the two sides. The Greek Cypriot administration should now reciprocate by ceasing all efforts to impose its usurped status over the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Until this is done, the process of negotiations will bear no fruit.

Özer Koray
Representative

APPENDIX III

Letter dated 5 May 1989 from Mr. Özer Koray
to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my government, I would like to bring to your attention the recent decision of the Greek Cypriot administration to reinforce military positions along the "Green Line" with new recruits of the so-called "Militia Forces" envisaged within the ongoing militarization program which constitutes an act of provocation against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

According to the Greek Cypriot daily Apoyevmatini of April 19, 1989, the "Militia Forces", comprising Greek Cypriot reserves over the age of 50, would shortly take up positions along the "Green Line" in Nicosia. It is reported that, National Guardsmen thus relieved, would be shifted to other "sensitive" areas.

The Greek Cypriot Minister of Defense, Mr. Aloneftis, as reported in the same newspaper, announced upon his return from the United States that, during the first phase beginning shortly after Easter holidays, 13 units would be established at forward positions in the most sensitive areas in Nicosia. The so-called Minister of Defense was also reported as saying that, once the organization and training of the first 13 units had been completed, the setting up and deployment of other units would immediately follow. Mr. Aloneftis also stated that, new recruits would then take up duties in military units along the borders to replace old ones alternately every 1-2 weeks in accordance with regional needs.

The newspaper noted that the units will be based in military camps in those regions but that it was not unlikely for them to receive orders from separate headquarters. It is further reported that additional reserves in other age groups would also be conscripted with a view to reinforcing the units and extending their operations.

Your Excellency is no doubt following these developments in South Cyprus as closely as the concerned authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The negative effects of the ongoing military preparations in South Cyprus on the current talks between the two sides conducted under Your Excellency's auspices can hardly be over-emphasized.

At this crucial stage, when the two leaders in Cyprus have started the third round of talks to reconcile their differences on the future federal settlement in the island, the ongoing military preparations in the South can only be interpreted as an obvious lack of good-will on the part of the Greek Cypriot side to reach such a settlement through peaceful means. Recently we have witnessed political maneuvers by the Greek Cypriot administration to frustrate the efforts to implement a deconfrontation plan in certain areas along the border in Nicosia. The positive attitude of the Turkish Cypriot side in this connection was met with unacceptable preconditions and accusations from the Greek Cypriot side which spared no effort to undermine the agreement and make political propaganda out of the whole issue. Recent military preparations along the "Green Line" have revealed that from the outset the Greek Cypriot side had no intention of signing this agreement which envisaged the unmanning of certain military positions in the Nicosia area.

In view of the above, the security concerns of the Turkish Cypriot side will remain as a priority issue in discussions on any future settlement in the island. So far, the constructive and conciliatory approach displayed by the Turkish Cypriot side in all aspects of the problem during the process of negotiations since August of last year has been confronted with an increasingly intractable stance at the negotiating table and an arming frenzy, incompatible with the spirit of negotiations.

I wish to reiterate my government's view that the success of Your Excellency's good offices mission in Cyprus will depend largely on the reversal of this perilous trend in South Cyprus and the restoration of mutual trust between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot peoples.

Özer Koray
Representative

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APPENDIX IV

Letter dated 23 May 1989 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

Upon instruction from my government, I would like to bring to your attention further developments in South Cyprus, as reported in the Greek Cypriot press, pertaining to the ongoing armament efforts of the Greek Cypriot administration.

1. The Greek Cypriot daily Ta Nea of May 4, 1989, reported that the so-called "Militia Forces", consisting of Greek Cypriots under the age of 50, would shortly be called for duty and that the first units would take up positions at sensitive points along the frontiers. The Greek Cypriot Minister of Defense is quoted in the same newspaper as saying that, within two years, "Militia Forces" would be established throughout South Cyprus, thus enabling the conscripts, when summoned, to join in with their units immediately.

2. The Greek Cypriot daily Alithia of May 12, 1989, reported that a draft bill has been introduced to the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives with a view to enabling the Greek Cypriot administration to increase its "defense fund" through credits totalling over 32 million pounds sterling. According to the same press report, additional sources were being sought as the envisaged budget allocations fell short of the level of spending required for the militarization program. The draft bill, which has already been debated at the House Defense Committee, will shortly be taken up by the House General Assembly for action.

I have, in my previous letters addressed to Your Excellency on the same matter, emphasized the concern of the Turkish Cypriot side in the face of the continuing aggressive policies of the Greek Cypriot side. Suffice it to say that the escalation of tension in the island as a direct consequence of the rearming attempts of the Greek Cypriot side will have detrimental effects on the process of negotiations between the two sides and that the responsibility for such an outcome will rest upon the Greek Cypriot leaders.

Özer Koray
Representative

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APPENDIX V

Letter dated 5 July 1989 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my government I would like to bring to your attention recent provocative statements by both the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, General Marcopoulos, and the Greek Cypriot Minister of Defense, Mr. Andreas Aloneftis, which shed further light on the extent and purpose of the ongoing military preparations in South Cyprus.

The Greek Cypriot daily Simerini of June 8, 1989 reported that, at a meeting of Greek Cypriot reserves in the Larnaca area, General Marcopoulos declared that their aim was to create an army which could go to war, if necessary, in support of the struggle of its political leadership to secure an "acceptable" solution to the Cyprus problem. The General also claimed that the military balance on the island had been effectively altered in favour of the Greek Cypriot side.

The Greek Cypriot Minister of Defense, addressing the same crowd, stated that his ministry attached utmost importance to reserve officers as they would be required to command the Greek Cypriot reserve forces in case of war. For the time being, Mr. Aloneftis said, the reserve officers would be in charge of the military groups set up in urban centers which would shortly be transformed into militia forces. Mr. Aloneftis added that a bill was being prepared to enable the promotion of these officers up to the rank of major in cognizance of their important role in the military. The so-called Minister of Defense also disclosed that his ministry was currently preparing a five-year plan which envisaged the equipment of the Greek Cypriot National Guard army with what he described as "super modern weapons system".

In view of the above, our conviction that the Greek Cypriot side is not inclined to abandon its age-old policy of settling the Cyprus issue by force of arms is further strengthened. Needless to say, the present policies of the Greek Cypriot administration, coupled with the ongoing military build-up in South Cyprus, are totally inconsistent with the spirit of the negotiations being conducted between the two sides under Your Excellency's auspices. I would, therefore, like to briefly reiterate that my government, as explained in my previous letters addressed to Your Excellency on the same subject, maintains its position that the responsibility for any possible disruption of the ongoing inter-communal talks as a direct consequence of these aggressive policies pursued by the Greek Cypriot administration, will have to be borne directly by the Greek Cypriot side.

Ozer Koray
Representative

APPENDIX VI

Letter dated 12 July 1989 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my government, and further to my letters in connection with the ongoing armament efforts of the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus, I would like to bring to Your Excellency's attention the following new disturbing developments in this regard:

1. The Greek Cypriot daily Agon reported on June 19, 1989 that, following the recent decision of the Greek Cypriot administration to purchase military equipment to bolster its offensive forces, members of the Defense Committee of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives had flown to Europe in order to visit weapons manufacturing plants in two NATO countries. The newspaper further noted that, in accordance with a program, the House Defense Committee members were to visit several large-scale plants belonging to companies with which agreements had been reached for the purchase of various military equipment by the Greek Cypriot administration. In late May, the paper added, 180 million Cyprus pounds had been allocated for this purpose by the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives and that a large portion of this fund was to be used in payment for weapons which had already been delivered to the Greek Cypriot National Guard.

According to the same news report, a spending of over 260 million Cyprus pounds is envisaged during the next three years in meeting the requirements of the National Guard armament program. Agon further noted that the House Defense Committee is examining various options, including tax measures, designed for the strengthening of the Greek Cypriot "defense" fund and that prior to any reference by the Committee to the House General Assembly, the issue will be taken up with the political parties.

2. The Greek Cypriot Minister of the Interior, Mr. Christodoulos Benjamin, made the following statement on the occasion of the recent "Cataclysm Festival" in South Cyprus:

> "Today our thoughts are not directed only towards Famagusta. Our thoughts surpass the barbed wires and the divisory lines, embrace our captive villages and towns, the places we love and our homes which we shall never forget or give up.
>
> "Today, the invading forces may be holding onto our ancestral lands by force of arms, trumpling upon our basic freedoms and rights; but no force or occupier can extinguish the love for our country, no Atilla can erase the longing for our country or lessen the zeal to return to our homes."

The above statement by Mr. Benjamin is just one of the long chain of provocative statements made by the Greek Cypriot military and political leaders against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in a concerted and war-mongering fashion. It is also no coincidence that an upsurge in such statements come at a time when the offensive military capability of the Greek Cypriot forces are at an all-time high and increasing steadily.

As long as the policy of the Greek Cypriot administration continue to be one of aggression and intimidation against the Turkish Cypriots, the attainment of mutual trust and cooperation between the two peoples as a prerequisite to a federal settlement in the island, will remain to be a remote possibility.

Özer Koray
Representative

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APPENDIX VII

Letter dated 22 August 1989 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed by my government to bring to your attention the following in connection with the armament efforts of the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus:

1. It has come to our knowledge that the Greek Cypriot administration has recently placed orders with certain foreign companies for the purchase of a number of AMX-30 B-2 tanks, 35 mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft weapons and VAB-UTM 800 model armored personnel carriers to be used by the Greek Cypriot National Guard. In addition, it has been ascertained for the first time that an order was placed for the purchase of Gazelle and Jet Ranger type helicopters, as well as Aspide and Sparrow missiles. It is believed that the unknown quantity of arms and weaponry recently delivered at the port of Limassol included M-16 type assault weapons which were distributed promptly to the National Guard forces.

2. It is observed that there has been an upsurge in the arms purchases of the Greek Cypriot administration over the last three months. For this purpose, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives has approved appropriations in the order of 180 million Cyprus pounds and has also authorized the spending of over 145 million Cyprus pounds by the Board of Directors of the so-called Defense Strengthening Fund. It is also known that a large portion of this allotment will be used in payment for the AMX-30 B-2 tanks which were purchased from France and are expected to be delivered ahead of schedule in the next few months.

The Greek Cypriot side should be made to realize that the Cyprus issue cannot be settled by force of arms, but only by peaceful negotiations based on mutual trust and understanding of the concerns and expectations of the two peoples. Under the circumstances, the Turkish Cypriot side cannot be expected to have confidence in its southern neighbour whose ulterior motives are clearly demonstrated by deeds as well as public statements.

Özer Koray
Representative

APPENDIX VIII

Letter dated 20 September 1989 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my government, I would like to bring to your attention recent reports in relation to the purchase of modern tanks, aircraft and other weaponry from France and Switzerland by the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus as further evidence of the ongoing preparations for war in South Cyprus.

According to Greek Cypriot press reports, quoting Greek Cypriot "Defense Ministry" sources, the Vassiliou administration has purchased 35 AMX-30 B-2 tanks from France, thus bringing the number of such tanks in the hands of this administration to over 50, and the total number of tanks to over 150. The same sources are also quoted as saying that the delivery of the tanks will start before the end of the year and that the new tanks will be armed with "super modern weapons systems" in order to enhance their striking power and capabilities by several- fold. It will also be recalled that, in addition to the above, the Greek Cypriot administration has recently purchased armored vehicles, Gazelle helicopters equipped with HOT missiles as well as Mistral and Matra type anti-aircraft missiles from France. A more detailed report on Greek Cypriot armament procurements from France appeared in the September 4, 1989 issue of "Defense News" which has been annexed to my letter published as a UN document on September 15, 1989 (A/43/1013, S/20845).

It has also come to our knowledge that the Greek Cypriot administration has purchased two PC-9 type aircraft from Switzerland and that they will be delivered to the National Guard shortly. The planes, ostensibly to be used for flight training purposes, are in fact capable of being equipped with anti-tank, anti-personnel rockets, machine- guns and other assault weapons. It will also be remembered that the Greek Cypriot administration had previously procured Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns and Skyguard fire control systems from this country.

It is regrettable that Switzerland, while declaring support for the intercommunal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, is at the same time selling arms to the Greek Cypriot administration and unwittingly encouraging its hostile and intransigent attitude toward the process of negotiations. Switzerland should be in a position to know that every missile or weapon going into the armories of the Greek Cypriot National Guard constitutes a new impediment in the way of a peaceful settlement in Cyprus. Therefore, the course of action taken by the Swiss government can only be described as unbecoming of a neutral European state like Switzerland.

Similarly, France's active support for the Greek Cypriot rearmament efforts is looked upon with deep regret by the people and government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The continued supply of tanks and sophisticated weapons to South Cyprus is a source of grave concern to my country, especially when those arms bear the mark of a supplier country which happens to be one of the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council whose mission is to ensure peace and security in the world and to promote amicable settlement of disputes.

It is now apparent that the Greek Cypriot administration intends to go further with its rearmament program, which has already assumed alarming and dangerous proportions. This is also borne out by recent Greek Cypriot news items, dated August 29 and September 6, which reported that the Greek Cypriot administration sought to increase contributions to its so-called "defense fund" from 2 to 3 per cent as the envisaged budget allocations have already been depleted and that additional funds were necessary to implement the program for the purchase of modern and sophisticated weapons. The same sources also reported that the Greek Cypriot "Minister of Defense", by a new bill introduced to the House of Representatives, intended to conscript an additional 140 Greek and Greek Cypriot officers to assume various commanding positions in the National Guard.

Your Excellency has been duly kept informed by the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the accelerated pace of military build-up in South Cyprus and the parallel increase in tension between the two sides in Cyprus since Mr. Vassiliou came to power in February 1988. Your Excellency will recall that the massive spending

by the Greek Cypriot administration for its ongoing militarization program has been coupled with the formation of "Militia Forces" as part of the illegal National Guard and the conscription of all able-bodied Greek Cypriots for military service. Furthermore, incessant provocative statements by Greek Cypriot military and political leaders have served only to exacerbate the already tense situation. When organized demonstrations and cease-fire violations by the Greek Cypriots did take an upsurge, the same Greek Cypriot leaders applauded and encouraged such actions. As a result, shooting incidents on the borders turned into cold-blooded murder or attempted murder on several occasions, December 1988 and May 1989 incidents being the most recent ones. The Greek Cypriot demonstrators, on the other hand, violated the buffer zone on several occasions in November 1988. And again in March 1989, the borders of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus were violated by Greek Cypriot women at two places. Most recently, on July 19, a mass demonstration by Greek Cypriot women culminated once again in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus border violations.

Against this background, and given the level of militarization in South Cyprus and the declared intention of further escalating the arms build-up, the next probable step to be taken by the Greek Cypriot administration would be in the form of a show of military force against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Unless preventive measures by all concerned, including the United Nations, are taken urgently the consequences of any attempt of military adventurism on the part of the Greek Cypriot side will prove to be disastrous and irreperable. The responsibility for such an eventuality will, no doubt, rest on the Greek Cypriot side and on countries which have supplied weapons to the Greek Cypriots and continue to do so.

Özer Koray
Representative

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APPENDIX IX

Letter dated 22 November 1989 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my government, and further to my letters on the same subject, I would like to bring to your attention the following recent actions taken and statements made by the Greek Cypriot military and political leaders in line with their militarization program in South Cyprus:

1) According to the Greek Cypriot daily Filelefttheros, the Greek Cypriot "Minister of Defense", Mr. Andreas Aloneftis, addressing a crowd at the Greek Cypriot village of Frenaros on November 5, 1989, stated, among other things, that the Greek Cypriot National Guard, which had been reinforced with new conscripts and newly purchased sophisticated weaponry, was now in a position to "encounter and reverse the fait accomplis created by the forces of Attila". Mr. Aloneftis was reported as saying that, notwithstanding minor tactical disagreements, the political leadership fully supported such efforts and that there existed no difference of opinion in South Cyprus with regard to the "ultimate aim".

2) The same daily, Filelefttheros of November 7, 1989 reported that the Greek Cypriot Defense Minister had informed the House Defense Committee that a new 10-year plan was being prepared by his Ministry for the reorganization of the "National Guard". According to another Greek Cypriot daily, Agon, the "Ministry of Defense" would also be reorganized and new personnel would be recruited to meet the additional service requirements envisaged by the new plan. It was also reported that the first group of 200 women conscripts would start military service in January 1990 and would be sent to Greece for training. Construction of training centers in South Cyprus was also under consideration. Moreover, new measures would be taken to increase the number of military personnel serving in the National Guard under contract.

In this connection, an article by a Greek Cypriot economist-researcher, Mr. Economides, published in the November 13, 1989 issue of Filelefttheros, is also worth mentioning. In this article, Mr. Economides points out that the ongoing Greek Cypriot rearmament efforts run counter to Mr. Vassiliou's declared aim of settling the Cyprus issue in the shortest possible time and through inter-communal dialogue. Mr. Economides stresses that the Greek Cypriot leader's intention of going ahead with a program designed to change the military balance on the island is a provocative action undermining the efforts for a settlement by peaceful means and, thus, increasing the likelihood of a military confrontation in the island.

Mr. Economides also concurs with foreign sources that the Turkish side has no military or other ambitions in Cyprus. He further notes that the same thing could not be said for the Greek Cypriot National Guard, given the war-like preparations and the statements made to that effect. In conclusion, Mr. Economides states that the astronomical amounts of money spent on weapons served no purpose other than to increase the deficit of the Greek Cypriot budget. He calls upon the Greek Cypriot leadership to use common sense and to reconsider its decisions taken in connection with the militarization program.

It is encouraging to see that some Greek Cypriots, such as Mr. Economides, have come to realize that their leadership is on a very dangerous path. It is regrettable, however, that the Vassiliou regime is heedlessly pursuing a military build-up program and continuing its hostile activities against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This is not compatible with the ongoing dialogue. Therefore, the Greek Cypriots should decide whether they want a peaceful solution through dialogue, or military confrontation which would be in nobody's interest, and would inevitably be the end of all efforts made for a federal solution between the two peoples.

Özer KORAY
Representative of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. At the 44th plenary meeting of its forty-fourth session, on 1 November 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/17 entitled, "Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity". 1/

2. In paragraph 22 of the resolution, the General Assembly:

> "Calls upon the United Nations organs - in particular the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the Special Committee against Apartheid - to continue to associate closely the Organization of African Unity with all their activities concerning Africa."

Notes

1/ Not reproduced in the present document; for the full text, see document A/RES/44/17.

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